A Deal With The Devil

The Perils of US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The signing of the conditional peace agreement with the Taliban in Doha, Qatar seems to have reenergized those in favor of a U.S. military withdrawal. This agreement is initiated by the United States in order for President Trump to make good on his campaign promise, just as his campaign promise to build a monstrosity of a wall at the Mexican border in order to keep Illegal immigrants out is in full swing, in spite the wall being scaled by using a $5 rope ladder and the idea proving to be a complete waste of taxpayers money.

Similarly, without a political settlement, which is still a longshot, a U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan will start having serious repercussions. Paramount among them will be the resurgence of terrorism and the deterioration of human rights—especially women’s rights—that come with a Taliban victory. The question to be posed is since when are the Taliban known for keeping promises?

Under the terms of the deal, the U.S. commits to withdrawing all of its military forces and supporting civilian personnel, as well as those of its allies, within 14 months. The drawdown process will begin with the U.S. reducing its troop levels to 8,600 in the first 135 days and pulling its forces from five bases.

The rest of its forces, according to the agreement, will leave "within the remaining nine and a half months."

The Afghan government also will release up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners as a gesture of goodwill, in exchange for 1,000 Afghan security forces held by the Taliban.

The fragile agreement has already run into a stumbling block, as the implementation phase begins, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has refused to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners which is aimed at ending America's longest war after more than 18 years and getting rival Afghan factions to agree on their country's future.

In the Afghan capital, Kabul President Ashraf Ghani said that this wasn't a promise the United States could make. He said the release of any prisoners was a decision for his government, adding that he wasn't ready to release them

The request has been made by the United States for the release of prisoners, and it can be part of the negotiations, but it cannot be a precondition," Ghani said.

The U.S.-Taliban deal is seen as a historic opportunity to extricate the United States from Afghanistan, a nation convulsed by conflict since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. But it could also unravel quickly, particularly if the Taliban fail to deliver on a promise that no terror attacks would be launched from Afghan soil.

The intra-Afghan talks between squabbling political factions and the rival Taliban are even more intricate -- even if a potential failure might not slow the withdrawal of American forces.

First, a U.S. exit would likely trigger a departure of European and other foreign forces from the country and a collapse of the Afghan regime. It is difficult to overstate the psychological impact of a U.S. exit, as Afghans fled—or tried to flee—the country. The Taliban, with support from Pakistan and limited assistance from countries like Iran and Russia, would likely attempt to seize and hold urban centers like Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, and eventually Kabul. At the moment, the Taliban does not control any cities in Afghanistan.

Second, a successful Taliban-led insurgency would likely allow the Islamic State Khorasan (the Islamic State’s local province), al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (al-Qaeda’s local affiliate), and other groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba to increase their presence in Afghanistan. Most of these groups have already expanded their presence in Afghanistan and conducted attacks either against the U.S. homeland (al-Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), U.S. forces and U.S. government installations in Afghanistan (Taliban and Haqqani Network), or Westerners in the region (Lashkar-e-Taiba).

A Taliban victory in Afghanistan would also be viewed by Salafi-jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as a major triumph against the United States. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was a tremendous source of inspiration and recruitment for al-Qaeda. Afghanistan has the largest number of Salafi-jihadist fighters and allies anywhere in the world next to Syria—more than in Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Third, a successful Taliban-led insurgency would deal a severe blow to human rights, including women’s rights. The Taliban remain deeply opposed to women’s liberties and would likely reverse progress in a country that has experienced a notable rise in the number of female business owners; female government officials; and primary, secondary, and university students (including girls).

Fourth, a Taliban victory could increase regional instability and security competition as countries like India and Pakistan—which both have nuclear weapons—support a mix of central government forces, sub-state militias, and insurgent groups.

What should the United States do? The Trump administration should work with the Afghan government and regional powers—including Pakistan—to reach a political settlement with the Taliban. But it is unclear whether the United States will succeed. After all, only a quarter of insurgencies end with a settlement. Nearly three-quarters end on the battlefield. Since World War II, insurgent groups successfully overthrew a government or gained independence in 35 percent of insurgencies, and governments defeated insurgents on the battlefield another 36 percent of the time.

The truce will not hold even after this fragile agreement, the Taliban have never kept their word and never will,

U.S. policymakers and the public need to carefully think through the implications of withdrawal. A precipitous exit might be worse than the status quo.